Research
Intensification and Intrahousehold Decision-making: Evidence from Burkina Faso
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Agricultural production in Burkina Faso involves multiple family members managing land. I explore the allocation of agricultural inputs between household members. The theoretical model derives the efficient and non-cooperative allocation of inputs. A key implication is that the head of the household can exploit the complementarity of inputs to influence how others choose to allocate their own labor.
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I find that efficient allocation of inputs is not achieved - plots managed by the household head receive about 62 percent more fertilizer and about 11 percent more family labor than what is optimal. Redistribution of inputs from the household head's plots to those of others would lead to higher agricultural production for the household. Moreover, I find evidence consistent with strategic behavior of the household to manipulate incentives for other household members in favor of the allocation he prefers.
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Policies aimed at increasing use of modern agricultural inputs should consider its impact on bargaining positions within the household. Providing inputs to younger people, especially women, will improve their bargaining position within the household, leading to greater equity within the household. It will also enhance allocative efficiency, since inputs are currently not allocated efficiently within the household.
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Asset Smoothing and Poverty Traps in Rural Burkina Faso
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The paper develops a conceptual model integrating intrahousehold decision-making in a standard poverty traps model. The model suggests that at key asset thresholds, productive assets are extremely valuable and households are willing to forego current consumption to protect assets. Also, there should be no differential sale of assets based on the gender of the owner. Lastly, the household should be more willing to sell assets when infants are present in the household, since their long-term well-being is highly affected by early life nutrition.
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Using a 3 year panel survey, I test the hypotheses by analyzing livestock sales when households face droughts and floods. While I do not find evidence of existence of key asset thresholds, I find that assets owned by women are more likely to be sold. Additionally, I find that households are more likely to sell assets if there is a baby boy rather than a baby girl in the household.